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Resum 
En aquest treball presentem un model per explicar el procés d’especialització vitícola assolit als 
municipis de la província de Barcelona, a mitjans del s. XIX,que cerca entendre com va sorgir 
històricament un avantatge comparatiu fruit d’un procés que esdevindria un dels punts de partida 
del procés d’industrialització a Catalunya. Els resultats confirmen els papers jugats pel impuls 
“Boserupià” de la població en un context d’intensificació de l’ús de la terra, i d’un impuls del mercat 
“Smithià” en un context d’expansió de la demanda per part de les economies atlàntiques. També es 
posa de manifest la importància de les dotacions agro-ecològiques i les condicions socio-
institucionals relacionades amb la desigualtat d’ingrés. La difusió de la vinya donà com a resultat 
unes comunitats rurals menys desiguals fins al 1820, tot i que aquesta desigualtat augmentà de nou a 
partir d'aleshores. 
JEL Codes: I39, N33, N53, Q56 
Paraules clau: Especialització agrícola, vinya, impuls de la població, integració del mercat, idoneïtat 
de la vinya, desigualtat rural, rati renda-salari, Catalunya. 
 
Abstract 
We present a model of vine-growing specialization in the municipalities of the province of 
Barcelona in the mid-19th century that explains how a comparative advantage arose through a 
process deemed to be one of the starting points for Catalan industrialization. The results confirm 
the roles played by the ‘Boserupian’ population-push on land-use intensification and the ‘Smithian’ 
market-pull in a growing demand from the Atlantic economy. They also stress the conditioning 
function of agro-ecological endowments and socio-institutional settings related to income 
inequality. Vineyard planting gave rise to less unequal rural communities until 1820, but inequality 
grew again afterwards. 
Keywords: Agricultural specialization, vine-growing, population push, market integration, 
grapevines suitability, rural inequality, rental-wage ratios, Catalonia 
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1. Introduction 
This article presents and tests a model which explains vine-growing specialization in the province of 
Barcelona, based on the stylized facts pointed out in many case studies published by rural 
historians. It combines the theoretical insights of either Hecksher-Olhin or the New Economic 
Geography approaches when considering comparative advantages, factor endowment and the 
impact market openness to international markets had on the Catalan economy. According to the 
existing historiography, the spread of vineyards started at the end of the 17th century and increased 
until the Phylloxera Vastatrix plague at the end of the 19th century. In 1858 115,454 hectares were 
planted with vines which accounted for 51 per cent of the farmland in the province of Barcelona, 
and some 16,000 hectares more were added until the Phylloxera crisis in the 1880s (Badia-Miuró et 
al., 2010). This process was triggered by the following driving forces: a) population growth; b) 
market connection with an increasing demand for liquors and wines from a growing Atlantic 
economy; and c) the planting of vineyards in mainly poor sloping lands landowners leased to small 
grower-tenants with little or no land of their own by an emphyteutic contract called rabassa morta in 
Catalan—as it expired when the vines planted died (Vilar, 1962; Giralt, 1965; Balcells, 1980; 
Carmona and Simpson, 1999; Colomé, 2000; Garrabou et al., 2000; Garrabou et al., 2008; Garrabou 
et al., 2009; Colomé et al., 2002; Badia-Miró et al., 2010). 
This wine-exporting specialization brought about the most important change crop allocation 
experienced in the Catalan rural society of that time. It had a deep effect on the composition and 
evolution of foreign trade (Pan-Montojo, 1994; Carmona et al., 2001, Valls, 2001a; 2001b; 2003; 
Pinilla and Ayuda, 2007). Furthermore, commercial profits accumulated by winemakers and traders 
also contributed to finance the comparatively early industrialization of Catalonia (Sudrià and 
Pascual, 1999; Marfany, 2010; 2012). A closer domestic market integration between rural and urban 
places was also fostered by means of this vine-growing specialization (Valls, 2007). Thanks to the 
opportunities which opened up for the poorest sections of the peasantry, a deeper domestic 
demand for cheaper textiles manufactured by the nascent industry ensued (Sánchez and Nadal, 
1998). This outcome of the Catalan viticulture stands out against other contemporary paths which 
some Southern European regions followed, such as the French Languedoc, where vines or looms 
became alternative ways of economic development (Johnson, 1995; Valls, 2004). Therefore, 
explaining winegrowing specialization in Catalonia is a relevant economic historical issue. 
Some partial versions of our model with successful results have already been published (Tello et al., 
2008; Garrabou et al., 2009). However, we are offering here what we consider to be the complete 
and final version of it. In the first section we present the model and the stylized facts of the 
available evidence. The second section enumerates the datasets that have allowed us to empirically 
test the model, going deeper into the expected impact of each variable. In section three we check 
the model against the datasets assembled. Section four discusses the results and conclusions. 
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2. A historical model to explain how a comparative advantage arose 
At first sight, the theoretical background underlying this historical narrative could be considered to 
be an applied version of the Heckscher–Ohlin model. According to it, vine-growing specialization 
would have developed in those Catalan municipalities with more favourable factor endowment to 
meet the increasing demand for wine. However, the existing literature not only points out that vines 
tended to spread where land and labour endowments were most suitable. Historians have also tried 
to explain how this comparative advantage arose throughout a specific historical process. Figure 1 
describes the set of driving forces to be considered. Some of them can be regarded as naturally 
given, such as agro-climatic endowment. Others depended on human agency, like migrations that 
changed population densities or the readiness of many landless peasants to invest their labour force 
to turn poor sloping land into terraced vineyards (Olarieta et al., 2008). 
Figure 1 – About here 
In other words, we are assuming an agency-oriented explanation of this historical process of land-
use change (Lambin et al., 2000; Moran and Ostrom, 2005). Figure 1 highlights the ‘Boserupian’ 
pushing force of increasing population densities that triggered more intensive land uses in mainly 
rural municipalities (Boserup, 1981; Netting, 1993; Hunt, 2000); and the market-pulling ‘Smithian’ 
force exerted by an overseas wine demand which induced a reallocation of land and labour towards 
vine-growing. These population-pushing or market-pulling forces had different impacts on the local 
land-use changes, depending on two other sets of conditioning factors, namely the specific agro-
climatic endowments and the existence of a labour force ready to enter into tenancy contracts to 
grow vines (Garrabou et al., 2008)                                                         . 
This agency-oriented model of land-use change combines what environmental historians (Cronon, 
1991) as well as New Economic Geography (Krugman, 1993a; 1993b) call first-nature and second-
nature variables. While agro-climatic endowments are first-nature factors, the dynamic interaction 
between the other variables becomes a set of second-nature drivers—included time-distances to the 
nearest seaport that we take as a proxy for the market-pulling force (Badia-Miró et al., 2010). What 
eventually really matters is the combination between them. Except for the pulling market force of 
demand, all variables had to move along a specific range of values, higher than a minimum but not 
exceeding an upper level, so as to fit with the rest in a suitable economic factor endowment. Local 
suitability to vine-growing was the outcome of a myriad of decisions taken by a lot of people 
interacting in a given set of challenges and opportunities which in turn they transformed.  
This agency-driven impulse set in motion self-reinforcing processes of vineyard planting, and some 
additional loops could be established within them. Planting vines using the long-lasting leases of 
rabassa morta could attract immigrants seeking new opportunities. This in turn might open a way of 
access to land for poor landless peasants, while the increasing reliance on distant markets may affect 
income distribution as well. The result would depend on the evolution of terms of trade and socio-
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institutional responses. As long as a foreign demand for wine kept growing at a higher rate than the 
local labour supply, we may expect that this market connection helped to reduce income inequality 
in winegrowing areas (Lindert and Williamson, 2003; Williamson, 2006; 2011). Though, the actual 
outcome would also depend on other social and political factors at stake. 
This vine-growing specialization stopped when one or several key variables exceed certain 
threshold values. For example, attaining population densities higher than the ones capable to be 
sustained by a still mainly agrarian economy, or exhausting marginal lands available to plant 
vineyards. As a result they faced a dilemma: Either demographic surpluses started to emigrate again 
towards other places, or local economies started a structural change to more industrial activities 
(Colomé et al., 2010, Colomé and Valls, 2012). It would be great to carry out this analysis along 
several dates, in order to assess whether or not the relative weight of first-nature and second-nature 
variables changed throughout this historical process. Nevertheless, the available datasets only allow 
us to perform a cross-section analysis in the mid-19th century. 
2.1. Specifying ‘Boserupian’ population push and ‘Smithian’ market pull  
Our first dataset is taken from the Estadística Territorial of the province of Barcelona compiled in 
1858 (Muro et al., 2011). This land-use figures have been benchmarked with other cadastral records 
used in several case studies, and they enabled us to highlight the role that a large number of farm 
plots held by poor smallholders, who had to give up on the idea of achieving self-sufficiency 
through poly-culture, played in the spread of vineyards (Garrabou et al., 2000; 2001; 2010; Tello et 
al., 2008). The spatial distribution of vineyards in the province of Barcelona in 1858 shows that 
basically vine-growing municipalities were located either along the coast (around the seaports of 
Mataró and Vilanova), or covered the flatter areas in the pre-littoral corridor (between the towns of 
Vilafranca del Penedès, Igualada, Manresa and Terrassa). We also observe a higher presence of 
vines in areas closer to Barcelona, and lower levels in the municipalities far from the coast—while 
there was a first ring allocated for grains and vegetables around the city (Map 1). 
Map 1 – About here 
A further step was to identify those municipalities that showed a cluster with similar levels of vine-
growing specialization by using local I-Moran’s indices: 
i i ij j
j
I z W z= ∑   
where Ii is the local I-Moran’s index, zi,t is the standardized value of the considered dataset in region 
i, and Wi,j is the spatial weight matrix.1 The results are shown in Map 2: 
                                                     
1 In our case, we consider queen contiguity standardized by length border, so that we have weighed contact 
values by the length of the common border among municipalities. This choice of the spatial weight matrix is 
not neutral. If we compare the results obtained from different weight matrices (non-standardized or 
standardized by number of neighbours) we could observe some dissimilarity, particularly among those 
6 
 
Map 2 – About here 
As expected, local spatial autocorrelation appears to be significant in high-high relations in three 
clusters of vine-growing specialization located in the south-west (the Penedès County, around the 
town of Vilafranca and approaching the town of Vilanova), at the north-east side of the city of 
Barcelona near the sea (the Maresme County, around the town of Mataró), and in some parts near 
the centre of the province (Pla de Bages County, around the town of Manresa). A significant 
autocorrelation cluster with low-low values appears at the northern parts, nearer to the pre-
Pyrenees mountains around the towns of Berga (Bergadà County) and Vic (Osona County). In the 
rest of the province vineyards seem to be randomly distributed, i.e. they were intercropped with 
grains, tree crops, woods and pastures in poly-cultural landscapes. 
Grape vines had been grown in Catalonia for many centuries before they became the main cash 
crop. They were traditionally planted as a temporary crop in small plots of woodland or scrub 
previously slashed and burnt, until the vines became too old and the vineyard was left to be 
reforested. Another crop pattern consisted of planting sparse rows of vines with strips of arable 
land in between, which were alternatively sown with grains or left fallow. These vineyards had long 
existed as a complementary side to the traditional agricultural system that produced wheat, wine 
and olive oil in a poly-cultural landscape whose surpluses were mainly oriented to local markets. 
Things started to change from the 17th century onwards, since population growth made it necessary 
to adopt more intensive land-use patterns while the Dutch trade connected the Western 
Mediterranean coast with the emerging Atlantic economy. This European or American demand for 
spirits and wines started to pull a new commercial type of winegrowing in Catalonia (Vilar, 1962; 
Fradera, 1987; Valls 2003). Moving beyond the city of Barcelona and its outskirts, population 
densities increased from nearly 20 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1718 to more than 36 in 
1787, and almost doubled again to 64 in 1857-1860. As a result, per capita land availability had 
reduced from more than five hectares per inhabitant to only one and a half throughout 140 years. 
In this context of market integration, the relationship between population growth and the change in 
crop patterns appears to be less obvious than expected. Up to a point, higher population densities 
fostered more intensive land uses, such as vine-growing, but further increases above a certain 
threshold could put an end to vineyard planting—for example, due to the development of 
industrious or industrial activities that would increase labour costs. An optimal population density 
for viticulture seems to have been between 25 and 65 inhabitants per km2 (Badia-Miró et al. 2010), 
a range that fits the upper threshold for a rain-fed agricultural economy established by Ester 
Boserup (1981). Only an urban–industrial economy could host higher population densities, as was 
the case in the industrializing districts of Barcelona, Mataró, Arenys de Mar, Terrassa, Sant Feliu de 
Llobregat and Vilafranca del Penendès in 1857 (Table 1). 
                                                                                                                                                           
municipalities with high-low and low-high relations. The high-high and low-low relations were robust and 
always appeared regardless of the matrix choice. 
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Table 1 – About here 
Map 3 outlines that those municipalities with higher population densities, together with the capitals 
of the districts, were clustered in coastal zones around Barcelona, and spread along the rivers 
Llobregat (with an additional area that extended to the Penedès and Anoia counties) and the Besòs-
Congost (along the Vallès County). Moreover, these were precisely the areas where Catalan 
industrialization began. 
Map 3 – About here 
Anyhow, it is not the population density at a given date that allows us to capture the push driving 
force exerted by the ‘Boserupian population pressure’ on land-use intensification. But we believe it 
to be the increase in population densities between some lower and upper thresholds preceding the 
change in crop allocation. As we have already checked in earlier versions of the model (Tello et al., 
2008), what becomes significant is the growth population experienced along a period of time before 
the levels of vine-growing specialization were laid down. Therefore, we use population increases 
from 1787 to 1860 as the ‘Boserupian’ variable. Map 4 and  
Map 5 show a rather random distribution of population growth rates, except in some municipalities 
near the towns of Vilafranca del Penedès, Igualada and Terrassa. 
Map 4 – About here 
Map 5 – About here 
How could these high population densities be fed? With average cereal yields at about 15-16 
hectolitres per hectare grown in 44 per cent of farmland, local production of food grains could only 
fulfil 39 per cent of the consumption needs circa 1860. To cover the other 61 per cent, the province 
of Barcelona had to import one million hectolitres of wheat per year from Castile or other inland 
regions of the Iberian Peninsula—since a ban on overseas imports of grain had been imposed in 
1820 so as to create a Spanish home market (Map 6). 
Map 6 – About here 
A deeper market integration of the regional economy ensued after two centuries of an export-led 
growth of Catalan viticulture. Therefore, market access became a key variable for the impact 
exerted by this ‘Smithian’ pulling impulse in different municipalities. Our model assesses this pull 
effect using travel costs to the seaports, as measured in time distances before the arrival of railways. 
Map 7 shows the isochronal curves to the nearest harbour (Mataró, Vilanova or Barcelona) during 
the first third of the 19th century. 
Map 7 – About here 
Before railroads, the location of every municipality had a deep impact on the economic access to 
foreign markets. Practically all inland trade had to be carried through cart roads and bridle paths. By 
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comparing maps 1 and 7, the relationship between vine-growing locations and time distances to the 
seaports becomes apparent. 
2.2. Specifying agro-climatic endowment 
Agro-climatic endowments acted as conditioning variables that mediated in the local responses to 
population-push and market-pull. Slope of the land and the texture of soils, rainfall, frost risk, solar 
radiation, together with altitude and average temperature determined the suitability of different 
lands for a range of possible crops (Map 8). 
Map 8 – About here 
Agronomists also use specific agro-climatic indices constructed to obtain a proxy of land aptitude 
for growing grapevines, such as the Huglin helio-thermic index or the Winkler and Amerine 
Effective Thermal Integral (Tonietto and Carbonneau, 2004).2 Their values are seen on Map 9: 
Map 9 – About here 
A relationship between vineyard locations and agro-climatic endowments shows up when 
comparing Map 1 with Maps 8 or 9. While municipal averages of temperature and solar radiation 
seem to be positively correlated with higher percentages of vineyards in farmland, a negative sign is 
expected when it comes to frost risk. On a less obvious way, average slope and water stress are also 
expected to be positively correlated with vineyards since landowners had tended to allocate flatter 
and moister soil to grow vegetables and cereals, and leased sloping and drier lands to small vine-
growing tenants. Similarly, we expected the Huglin and Winkler indices to show a positive and 
significant impact on vine-growing specialization. However, as it will be explained, our results do 
not confirm this assumption. The reasons seem to lie in the fact that in Catalonia growing vines was 
not first choice of landowners, but only a second best for lands less suitable for growing grain. 
2.3. Specifying inequality in agricultural wealth and income distribution  
A source published in 1852, the Repartimiento Personal de la Riqueza Territorial, has allowed us to take 
into account inequality in agricultural wealth and/or income distribution, seen as another 
conditioning factor of the local impact of population push and market pull on winegrowing 
specialization. This rather exceptional record lists the names of all owners of land, houses and 
livestock who were subjected to the cadastral tax. The document adds up the evaluation of their 
annual taxable incomes to obtain the corresponding tax burden of every municipality (Bravo 
                                                     
2 Given that vines stop vegetative activity below a temperature of ten degrees, and that above that level their 
growth depends on available sunlight for photosynthesis, the Huglin index of helio-thermal aptitude is 
obtained by the expression: IH = S[(Ta–10°)+(Tm–10°)]K/2, where Ta is the daily average temperature, Tm is 
the maximum daily temperature during the active period of vegetation, and K is the length ratio of days 
varying from 1.02 to 1.06 between 40 and 50 degrees latitude. The Active Thermal Integral (ATI) is calculated 
by adding the daily mean temperatures above or equal to 10°C during the active period of vegetation between 
March and October: ATI = STa, where Ta is the active temperature. The Effective Thermal Integral (ETI) of 
the Winkler and Amerine index is the sum of effective daily mean temperatures, calculated from the monthly 
average temperatures multiplied by days of each month during the growth season from April to October. So 
that, ETI = STe, where the effective temperature (Te) is the active temperature (Ta) minus 10°C. 
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Murillo, 1852). Although several historians have used some information taken from these lists, this 
is the first time that a large dataset is created and thoroughly analysed using the whole information 
they contain. Our database includes more than 86,000 taxpayers in 295 municipalities out of the 
311 existing at present in the province. They represented 12% of the total population, 24% all 
males, and 41% of all male inhabitants older than 21, as recorded in the provincial census of 1857. 
However, this rather exceptional information contains an important ambiguity: Are we calculating 
inequalities of wealth or income? Wealth inequality is always greater than income inequality, as 
people have to survive even with lower incomes while properties are accumulated over generations 
only by those who earn higher ones (Van Zanden, 1995). As is fully explained in (Tello and Badia-
Miró, 2011), the data provided refers only to the aggregate value of these properties locally owned 
by each taxpayer in every municipality, according to the standardized procedures applied by the 
cadastral officials—including the estimated incomes earned by grower tenants (Peña, 1852). Labour 
people with no property or tenancy were excluded, while 84% of ratepayers were smallholders 
having only a poor house with a family garden of their own. The implicit rent of the latter 
amounted up to 2,000 Spanish reales, an income near the poverty line of that time (Cerdà, 1867). 
Thus, our dataset becomes truncated and skewed as it is somewhere between wealth and income 
distribution. In order to turn this dataset on personal real estate wealth into a clearer distribution of 
agricultural incomes, we have added all non-owners male adults older than 21 before calculating 
some of our inequality indices; and then, in order to correct the agricultural wages missed, a 
minimum vital income of 1,500 reales a year has also been added to the earning valuation of 
properties and tenancies held (Garrabou and Tello, 2002, Tello and Badia-Miró, 2011).3 
Now we come to the main question: Which was the expected relationship between income 
distribution and vine-growing specialization? Given that the long-lease rabassa contract established 
that the tenancy lasted until the vines’ death, grower tenants used to bury strains in order to keep 
them alive so as to turn their access to the land almost permanent. The duration of the contract, 
and the rent share over the vintage, became the contested issues of a long social conflict that lasted 
from the end of the 18th century until the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) (Balcells, 1980; Tello, 
1997; Carmona and Simpson, 1999). Despite this long-lasting clash between landowners and 
tenants, the spread of the rabassa tenancy system may be regarded as a praiseworthy achievement of 
the poorest sections of Catalan rural society owing to their collective action. In fact, up to the first 
decades of the 19th century vine-growing had led to a less unequal income distribution compared to 
                                                     
3 What credibility can we give to this source, given its tax purpose? From the private records of the 
Marquis of Sentmenat we know that during the five years between 1850 and 1854 this landlord 
earned in the municipalities of Sentmenat and Palau-solità-i-Plegamans an average yearly income of 
12,047 and 15,983 reales respectively (Garrabou et al., 2001). The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real 
Estate Ownership of 1852 attributed to him a yearly cadastral income of 11,607 and 15,323 reales in 
those places. 
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cereal-cropping or forestry municipalities (Garrabou and Tello, 2002; Tello and Badia-Miró, 2011). 
Anyhow, was this achievement attained thanks to or in spite of the consequences market 
integration and population growth brought about?  
The answer is far from simple. Following a Heckscher-Ohlin approach, the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem states that an increase in relative prices of a commodity will lead to a rise in the return to 
that factor which is used most intensively in producing it, and conversely, to a reduction in the 
return to the other less abundant factor. By adopting this theoretical insight, economic historians 
have shown that the First Globalization following the fall in maritime freight costs from 1870 to 
the First World War entailed a rise in relative prices of agricultural goods in front of manufactures. 
This in turn led to a greater inequality in land-abundant and labour-scarce countries that exported 
primary commodities—as reflected in the rental-wage ratio increases in regions such as Latin 
America or Eastern Europe. Conversely, labour-abundant and resource-scarce countries, such as 
Japan and Western Europe, experienced a decrease in rental-wage ratios and a lesser inequality in 
income distribution (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2001; Lindert and Williamson, 2003; Williamson, 
2006; 2011).4 
Between these contrasting outcomes, where can the case of Catalan viticulture be placed? First of 
all, we consider the increase in market involvement which initially ran at a slow pace along the 18th 
century and during the first half of the 19th century. Local populations could increase at a lower or 
greater rate than the changes relative prices experienced, and be reinforced by migratory flows that 
altered labour endowment at local level. Social unrest also increased along this period, a 
phenomenon which led to institutional changes and political decisions that affected income 
distribution.5 Looking at the available evidence, we face what seems a contradictory picture. On the 
one hand, the Gini indices obtained with our dataset on agricultural wealth distribution in 1852 
clearly point out a lower inequality level in vine-growing municipalities compared to the ones 
mainly allocated to cereal cropping and forestry (Table 2). 
Table 2 – About here 
Per capita incomes were also lower in vine-growing municipalities than in the rest, thus we prompt 
the following question: Was the lower wealth inequality level simply due to their relative poverty?6 
                                                     
4 According to (Williamson, 2006: 48), wage-rental ratios would have experienced in Spain a slower increase 
than other non-protectionist European countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark or Sweden from 
1870 to 1914. See also (Prados de la Escosura, 2008). 
5 (Santiago-Caballero, 2011) shows how inequality decreased in the cereal-growing inland Spanish province of 
Guadalajara during the last third of 18th century due, as it seems, to a successful local land reform. 
6 This fits the estimates made in the mid-18th century in France by François Quesnay, who attributed to vine-
growing peasant-owners the lowest non-wage agricultural income in his Tableau Économique (Milanovic, 2010). 
Thanks to the revolution, French winegrowers became mainly property-holders: Exactly the same status that 
rabassa tenants sought in Catalonia. Compared to them, the Catalan vine-growing tenants can only be 
considered as would-be peasants. Nevertheless, their legal and economic status was stronger than other 
tenants-at-will, or labour-tenants, that existed in several regions of Europe at the time, such as the statartorpare 
in Sweden, husmennene in Norway, husmaendene in Denmark, or heuerlinge in North-western Germany (Morner, 
1970; Schlumbohm, 1996). 
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To answer this question, we calculated the Theil index of an estimated agricultural income 
distribution including all adult males, and obtained the corresponding Extraction Ratios (ER) 
compared to a maximum Inequality Possibility Frontier (IPF) related to per capita income 
(Milanovic et al., 2011). The results confirm that not only agrarian income inequality was lower in 
vine-growing municipalities but extraction ratio as well. 
Nevertheless, when looking at the long-term trends showed by rental-wage ratios from 1826 to 
1893 it becomes apparent that land rents captured almost all gains taken from the two waves of 
increase in the relative prices of wine. Agricultural wages did not, so income inequality must have 
tended to increase in Catalan vine-growing areas along the 19th century. Conversely, in cereal-
growing areas the long-term trend showed a reduction in rental-wage ratios that must have entailed 
a lowering of rural inequality (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 – About here 
The only way to reconcile the evidence given in Table 2 and Figure 2 is to establish a clear 
distinction between levels and trends. The long-lasting spread of vineyards from the mid-17th century 
to the beginning of the 19th century through rabassa leases seems to have reduced wealth and 
income inequality in winegrowing places, at least compared to grain-growing or forestry 
municipalities. As a result, circa 1850 vine-growing municipalities had lesser inequality levels than 
the rest. Anyhow, from 1825 onwards inequality started to rise again in vine-growing municipalities 
whereas in grain-growing areas it diminished. This contrast between levels and trends may help us 
to unravel a difficult conundrum. How can social unrest in vine-growing municipalities be 
explained, knowing that agricultural income was more evenly distributed in them than in any other 
area in the Barcelona province in the mid-19th century? 
Perhaps inequality in winegrowing areas was lower precisely because of the collective action Catalan 
rabassa tenants exerted, prompting their empowerment (Tello and Badia-Miró, 2011).7 On the other 
hand, Figure 2 clearly shows that landowners took almost all the gains in relative prices along the 
two main booms Catalan viticulture went trough, i.e. the Odium mildew in the 1840s, and the 
Phylloxera plague from 1875 to 1885 (Colomé et al., Forthcoming). Throughout the wine crisis 
Catalonia underwent after the Napoleonic wars in the 1820s, in the 1860s, and after 1885, the 
decrease in land rents was also lower than the diminishing trend in relative prices of wine—so that 
landowners succeeded in downloading the crisis on the rest of the population. Certainly, as 
sharecroppers Catalan vine-grower tenants could also take some gains from favourable trends in 
relative prices. However, most of them were smallholders lacking enough access to land to earn a 
                                                     
7 This relates to the connections between inequality as such, and the perception of it. As Alexis de 
Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America in 1835, ‘When inequality of conditions is the common law of society, the most 
marked inequalities do not strike the eye; when everything is nearly on the same level, the slightest are marked enough to hurt it. 
Hence the desire of equality always becomes more insatiable in proportion as equality is more complete’ (reference taken from 
(Stiglitz, 2012). Besides that, people in the lowest social strata also need to rely on some resources in order to 
struggle to improve their condition. Therefore, empowerment becomes more likely in societies with 
intermediate rather than extreme levels of inequality. 
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living, and had to search for additional incomes as daily labourers hired by wealthier landowners. As 
a result, income inequality must have tended to rise in winegrowing areas whereas it must have 
tended to fall in grain-growing municipalities—where land rents remained fairly stable while 
agricultural wages, which were lower there, tended to converge with coastal ones (Garrabou, Tello 
2002). This fits quite well to explain the reasons underlying the strong social and political 
polarization found within many Catalan rural communities which relied on viticulture during the 
second half of the 19th century, and along the first third of the 20th century as well (Planas and 
Valls, 2011). 
How do these contrasting results relate to the assumptions made by the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem? As we are dealing with a highly labour-intensive cash crop, we should expect that the 
expansion of viticulture entailed a reduction in inequality through a diminishing trend in rental-
wage ratios—always under a ceteris paribus assumption. Although we found evidence of lesser levels 
of wealth inequality in winegrowing municipalities in the mid-19th century, the historical series of 
rental-wage ratios seem to contradict the expected diminishing trend in vine-growing areas from 
1825 onwards. Therefore, we formulate a hypothesis with many nuances. On the one hand, the 
bold collective action from vine-growing rabassa tenants would have harnessed the underlying 
economic trends in their favour set up in line with Stolper-Samuelson assumptions, provided that 
these would have not been counteracted by the social power well-off landowners exerted and the 
public policies implemented at the time (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Milanovic, 2005; 2011). 
This was probably the case while this regional economy remained commercially open until 1820, 
but from that date on it was counteracted to a great extent. 
The strong protectionist trade policy implemented in Spain after 1820 highlights the social and 
political forces at stake. After the emancipation of the Latin American colonies, foreign imports of 
grain were simply banned in order to substitute them with cereals coming from inland Spain. It was 
not until the democratic revolution of 1868 that this ban was replaced with a moderate tariff which 
established an effective protection of about 10% over the wholesale wheat price in Barcelona. 
Following the restoration of the monarchy in 1874, the combined effect of higher tariffs and the 
devaluation of the Spanish currency increased this effective protection to nearly 20%. Then, in 1891 
onwards tariffs were subsequently raised to 30% and more. At the end of the 19th century effective 
protection reached 50% of the Catalan wheat price (Pascual, 1990: 138-141). This helps us to 
understand why most wealthy landowners kept their estates poly-cultural and allocated the better 
lands to cereal crops. 
This complex social and political fabric can also explain why it is not so easy to find a simple spatial 
pattern in the impact of vine-growing specialization in the evolution of rural inequality in Catalonia. 
As (Williamson, 2006: 58) pointed out, it is even likely that a reverse causality was established 
between commodity prices and factor endowment—so that a favourable evolution of relative prices 
fostered rabassa leases and attracted more immigrants, thus increasing cheap labour supply and 
making land-labour relations endogenous at a local level. The whole picture appears to be 
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sometimes rather blurred. Counter what we found in other variables, income inequality does not 
show spatial autocorrelation—which means that it was randomly distributed in space in the mid-
nineteenth century (Map 10). 
Map 10 – About here 
3. Running the model  
In order to test statistically the determinants of vine-growing specialization the following model has 
been used: 
1 2 3 4 5 , 1· · · ·j j j j j t jVDSup AGRCL MKAC INEQ AGPOBα α α α α ε−= + + + + +          (1) 
Where VDSupj is the percentage proportion of cropland allocated to vineyards, AGRCLj are a set 
of agro-climatic variables which could affect vineyard specialization (slope, rainfall, altitude, soil 
quality, frost risk and agro-climatic suitability indices for growing grapevines), MKACj captures the 
‘Smithian-pull’ effect through market access (either domestic or foreign) as assessed by time 
distances to the seaport of Barcelona.8 INEQj captures income inequality considering Theil indices 
of income inequality for adult male population as a whole, corrected with a subsistence wage 
income for all working-age men. To improve the robustness of the estimation we tried using 
Inequality Extraction Ratio, Theil index with no corrections and Gini index, but no better results 
were obtained. To capture the ‘Boserupian-push’ we consider AGPOBj,t-1, i.e., the population rate 
growth for each municipality between 1787 until 1860.9  
Finally, a few dummy variables were considered: CPJ for those municipalities which were capital 
districts, and DMES70a for those with population densities greater than 70 inhab./km2. Both cases 
allow us to assess the impact of more urban and diversified economies on vine-growing 
specialization, and a negative sign ought to be expected. We have also considered DM_King to 
search for a possible positive effect of municipalities having the King as manor, instead of having a 
member of the nobility or the Church before the manorial system was abolished in 1836—provided 
that this could entail a more flexible institutional framework. However, no robust results were 
obtained in all estimates. 
Table 3 – About here 
Population growth rates between 1787 and 1860 were significant and with the expected sign, so 
that municipalities with higher rates of population increase before 1860 had higher shares of 
                                                     
8 When a one-time benchmark is considered the choice for a market access variable is not as relevant as when 
using a time series analysis. Innovation in transport facilities has a deeper impact in the latter case (Badia-Miró 
et al., 2010). 
9 We have also considered population densities to capture ‘Boserupian’ effects, but no better results were 
obtained. Coefficients were significant but with a negative sign. This suggests that in the mid-19th century the 
range of population density suitable for growing vineyards had already been attained or even surpassed in 
most areas of the province of Barcelona with appropriate agro-ecological endowments. Further population 
increases above that upper threshold entailed a negative impact in winegrowing. 
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farmland allocated to vineyards. This confirms the ‘Boserupian-push effect’ which favours more 
labour-intensive crops. The significance of dummy variables related to capital districts or having 
population densities higher than 70 inhab./km2 may suggest the existence of an upper threshold of 
some 65 inhab./km2, or one and a half hectares per inhabitant, a figure above which the population 
push ceased to foster winegrowing. The market access pull, as measured with time-distances to 
Barcelona, is always significant and negative except when spatial autocorrelation is considered. This 
highlights the ‘Smithian-pulling force’ of foreign market access for wine and liquor exports 
combined with the ‘Boserupian-push effect’.  
The joint impact of these drivers on local land-use changes depended upon other sets of 
conditioning factors: Agro-ecological suitability, and income inequality. No surprises appear when 
using agro-climatic variables. Rainfall levels are significant and negative, indicating vines were 
planted in drier lands while moister ones were reserved to grain and vegetables. The same happens 
with altitude. Frost risk is significant and positive. Slope is also significant and negative, and the 
square of the slope has a negative sign showing that it has a decreasing positive impact. All these 
results confirm that vineyards were planted as a second-best choice in poorer and sloping lands 
which were less suitable for grain—but not as much as in forestlands and pastures. We have also 
repeated the estimates considering the municipal helio-thermal values taken with the Huglin index 
and the Winkler and Amerine ETI, which are expected to capture the better locations for planting 
grapevines. Coefficients are not significant, thus reinforcing again that vineyard locations can not be 
simply explained as a resource allocation owing to agro-climatic endowments given. Therefore, 
what seems relevant is the interaction between the whole set of variables that put in motion an 
agency-driven process that created a comparative advantage from the available resources. 
An important leap forward of our model is to have included inequality as a relevant variable for the 
first time, and it appears to be significant and negative. That is, those municipalities with higher 
levels of income inequality tended to have lower vine-growing levels. Conversely, the ones with 
more even income distribution had higher proportions of vineyards in their farmland in the mid-
19th century. To test the robustness of this result we have also considered income inequality values 
only for the cadastral valuation of the taxpayers’ properties, and extraction ratios. In all cases the 
result was the same, showing significant coefficients and the expected sign.10 
This meaningful result is not merely an outcome of the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism applied to a 
labour-intensive cash-crop. Due to the social power agrarian elites held, and the public policies 
implemented in their favour, the evolution rental-wage ratios experienced in Catalan winegrowing 
areas from 1820 onwards was exactly the opposite to the one expected according to a ceteris paribus 
                                                     
10 We have also analysed the weight that each term of the equation has in the final outcome. The result 
reveals that geographical variables such as altitude, rainfall or slope have a slightly greater impact than the 
others. Among the agency-oriented variables, inequality and market access stand out over the impact of 
population push. 
15 
 
assumption required by this theorem. Thus, we have to stress the roles played by the protectionist 
Spanish trade policy, and by the Catalan rabassa-sharecroppers who fiercely fought against their 
landowners to stay in the land, reduce the rent share or even become whole owners of the 
vineyards. They did not achieve this last aim—except when the Catalan Tenancy Act was passed in 
1934, which Franco’s dictatorship abolished in 1939. But they were successful to some extent with 
the former attempt. 
Finally, we have also run some regressions to correct possible spatial autocorrelation problems. As 
expected, spatial autocorrelation only appears in the impact of time-distances to Barcelona and for 
average municipal rainfall. All other variables maintain significant coefficients with the expected 
sign, reinforcing the robustness of the results obtained. 
4. Concluding remarks 
After having successfully included income inequality as a variable, we consider this to be the final 
and complete version of our model which explains agricultural vine-growing specialization degree 
attained in the province of Barcelona in the mid-19th century. It has not been conceived as simply a 
replication of Hecksher-Ohlin or any other static economic model requiring a ceteris paribus 
assumption, but as a historical dynamic explanation of how a comparative advantage was actually 
created through an agency-driven process. From this standpoint, the interaction between context 
and agency becomes crucial. People acted according to the range of opportunities and resources 
that were available in their context. However, their agency also changed this context and opened 
new opportunities or altered to a point the prevailing factor endowment. 
By gathering large datasets available from many sources, not yet fully exploited, we have 
successfully tested a thorough explanation of this historical process of winegrowing specialization, 
deemed to be a starting point for industrialization and modern economic growth in Catalonia. Our 
results confirm the prime role played by the ‘Smithian’ market-pulling force combined with the 
‘Boserupian’ population-pushing effect, the two main drivers of land-use change. At the same time 
they stress the conditioning function the prevailing agro-ecological endowment had, as well as 
socio-institutional settings that gave rise to different levels of income or wealth inequality. What 
stands out most is the fact that vineyard specialization can not be explained as a simple market-
driven resource reallocation, undertaken only according to a given set of agro-climatic features. The 
active development of second-nature factors is as important as the first-nature endowments set in 
advance (Cronon, 1991; Krugman, 1993b). 
As the rest of these variables had already been tested in previous versions of the model (Garrabou 
et al., 2009), the most important novelty found is that land-use profiles of inequality in agricultural 
income distribution matter a great deal. In Catalonia, vineyard spread led to a less unequal rural 
society until the mid-19th century. However, these lower inequality levels in winegrowing 
municipalities went later hand in hand with a rise in rental-wage ratios that showed a persistent 
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trend to increase inequality again—a result which contradicts the expected situation in a labour-
intensive cash-crop according to the Stolper-Samuleson theorem under a ceteris paribus assumption. 
This helps us to explain the strong polarization and ceaseless social unrest that existed in 
winegrowing Catalan municipalities from the mid-19th century until the Spanish Civil War (1936-
1939). 
We may conclude that by transforming a previous landscape of brushwood and forest, or of cereal 
crops grown in unsuitable poor land, into vineyards these rabassa sharecroppers not only opened a 
gateway for themselves within Catalan villages and towns. They also gained a place in society and a 
share of its income. By increasing population numbers and deepening the home market, this helped 
to turn Catalonia eventually into a late-modern industrious society and an early-contemporary 
industrial economy. Some legacies of this historical path remain nowadays. Ironically, the most 
tasteful and appreciated Catalan wines still come from these poor sloping lands formerly terraced 
by rabassers-tenants, while flatter lands with higher helio-thermic indices produce more abundant 
vintages of low quality grape juice only suitable for making sparkling cava. 
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Figures, tables and Maps 
Figure 1 - Pushing or pulling drivers and conditioning factors of Catalan vine-growing specialization developed 
until 1860 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
Source: Our own, based in (Garrabou et al., 2009; Badia-Miró et al., 2010). 
Conditional factors that modulated 
the local impact of driving forces 
pushing and pulling towards vine-
growing specialization: 
1. Agro-ecological land 
endowments 
2. Inequality in land 
ownership and tenure, or 
rural income distribution  
Push driving force: 
A. Increasing rural 
population  
density  
(by population growth 
and immigration) 
Pull driving force: 
B. Increasing demand 
for brandy and wine 
exports    
(by integration to 
international markets) 
% of vineyards in farmland 
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Map 1 - Proportion of cropland allocated to vineyards in every municipality in 1858 
 
       Source: Our own, from the Estadística Territorial (Muro et al., 2011). 
Map 2 – Univariate Local Moran for the vineyard specialization 
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Source: Our own making from the same data of Map 1 considering 
SpaceStat at a p-value=0.05. Red values indicate high-high relations, 
blue values are low-low relations, light reds are high-low relations 
and light blue are low-high relations. 
Table 1. Population increase and population densities in the districts of the province of Barcelona (1718-1857) 
Districts 
1718 1787 1857 yearly 
growth 
rates 
1718 - 
1858 
yearly 
growth 
rates 
1787 - 
1858 
Inhabi-
tants 
Inhab-
itants 
/km2 
ha     
/inhabi-
tant 
Inhabi-
tants 
Inhab-
itants 
/km2 
ha     
/inhabi-
tant 
Inhabi-
tants 
Inhab-
itants 
/km2 
ha     
/inhabi-
tant 
Barcelona 36,781 234.4 0.43 125,745 801.4 0.12 247,942 1,580.30 0.06 1.4% 1.0% 
Arenys  14,599 36.6 2.73 30,070 75.3 1.33 37,063 92.9 1.08 0.7% 0.3% 
Berga 12,121 10 10.03 19,299 15.9 6.3 39,632 32.6 3.07 0.8% 1.0% 
Granollers 16,819 27.7 3.61 22,819 37.5 2.66 38,521 63.4 1.58 0.6% 0.7% 
Igualada 12,354 12.5 8.02 25,714 26 3.85 54,934 55.5 1.8 1.1% 1.1% 
Manresa 16,586 14.7 6.8 25,692 22.8 4.39 53,057 47 2.13 0.8% 1.0% 
Mataró 16,639 92.2 1.08 29,986 166.2 0.6 43,164 239.3 0.42 0.7% 0.5% 
Sant Feliu  8,110 17.1 5.84 24,207 51.1 1.96 39,588 83.5 1.2 1.1% 0.7% 
Terrassa 9,937 17.3 5.79 20,552 35.7 2.8 52,737 91.7 1.09 1.2% 1.3% 
Vic 21,740 20.1 4.98 40,954 37.8 2.64 59,618 55.1 1.82 0.7% 0.5% 
Vilafranca  11,721 17.6 5.67 28,837 43.4 2.31 48,079 72.3 1.38 1.0% 0.7% 
TOTALS 177,407 23.7 4.23 393,875 52.5 1.9 714,335 95.3 1.05 1.0% 0.8% 
Outside 
Barcelona 
District 
140,626 19.2 5.2 268,130 36.6 2.73 466,393 63.7 1.57 0.9% 0.8% 
Sources: Our own, based on population census taken from Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics 
(http://www.ced.uab.es/index.php). 
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Map 3. Population densities and main transport networks in the province of Barcelona in 1860 
 
Source: Our own, from tha Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics 
(http://www.ced.uab.es/index.php). We thank Barcelona Regional for facilitating digital 
information on the road and rail networks in 1860. 
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Map 4. Average annual population growth rates from 1787 to 1860 
 
Source: Our own, with population data of the 1787 and 1860 census 
taken from the Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics (http://www.ced.uab.es/). 
Dark purple shows higher growth rates. 
 
Map 5. LISA map for average annual population growth rates to detect spatial autocorrelation (1787-1860) 
 
Source: Our own making considering SpaceStat at a p-value=0.05. Red 
values indicate high-high relations, blue values are low-low relations, 
light reds are high-low relations and light blue are low-high relations. 
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Map 6. Shortage in cereal food production to meet local consumption in the 
municipalities of the province of Barcelona (1859-67) 
 
Source: Our own, from the dataset compiled with the Estadístiques de la producció i consum de 
cereals als partits judicials de la província de Barcelona (National Library of Catalonia, Fons de la 
Junta de Comerç, lot CXXVI, boxes 163 and 164). 
28 
 
  
Map 7. Time distances to the nearest seaport using existing cart roads and bridle paths 
in the province of Barcelona in 1824-1838 
 
Source: Our own, from two itineraries published before the first Catalan railway was set up in 
1848 (Frigola, 1824; Anonymous, 1838), checked with other sources (Bertrán Soler, 1847) or 
authors (Vilar, 1962; Font, 1999; Pascual, 1999; Herranz-Loncán, 2007; 2008). 
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Map 8. Some agro-ecological endowments to grow vines or grains in the province of Barcelona 
Slopes Water stress 
Index of agrological suitability of soils Number of months with frost risk 
Source: Our own, made with GIS with current agro-climatic data in the province of Barcelona. 
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Table 2. Land-use profiles of inequality in agricultural wealth or income distribution in the municipalities of the 
province of Barcelona in 1852-1858 
Prevailing land uses 
Gini indices of the 
cadastral valuation 
of property 
Extraction Ratios expressed as % of the 
actual Theil indices of agricultural income 
distribution, compared to the maximum 
Inequality Possibility Frontier (IPF) average median 
all municipalities with land-use data in 1858 68.2 69.8 24.9 
mainly winegrowing municipalities 64.7 65.2 22.0 
mainly cereal cropping  69.1 69.9 25.2 
mainly allocated to forestry uses of land 70.1 72.0 25.0 
Source: our own, calculated from the Repartimiento Personal de la Riqueza Territorial of 1852 (Library of the University of 
Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13), the population census of 1857 (taken from the Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics,  
http://www.ced.uab.es/), and the Estadística Territorial compiled in 1858 (Muro et al., 2011). Theil indices, Extraction 
Ratios and the IPF have been calculated for the whole adult male population older than 21, and adding a minimum vital 
income of 1,500 Spanish reales a year (Tello and Badia-Miró, 2011). 
Figure 2. Evolution of rental-wage ratios in coastal winegrowing counties (Vallès), or in inland cereal cropping 
ones (Segarra and Urgell), compared to the relative prices of wine in Catalonia (1826-1893, all data in eleven-
year moving averages with the reference year in the middle)* 
 
Source: our own, calculated from the land rents of the Marquis of Sentmenat (Garrabou et al., 2011) and the Torelló 
family (Pascual, 2000), the series of agricultural wages from (Garrabou and Tello 2002), and the relative prices of wine 
from (Colomé et al., Forthcoming). 
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Map 10. Income inequality in the municipalities of the province of Barcelona, according 
to the Gini indices of the cadastral valuation of property in 1852-1858 
 
Source: Our own, from the sources referred in Table 2. Greener municipalities have 
higher levels and yellower lesser levels of income inequality. 
 
Table 3. Explaining vine-growing specialization in the province of Barcelona in the mid-19th century 
Note: t-ratios are in cursive; ***1, **5, or *10% statistical confidence interval. OLS, ordinary least squares. OLS – Spatial 
Lag, ordinary least squares considering spatial lags to correct spatial autocorrelation biases.  
 
const 1.100 0.110 *** 0.921 0.107 *** 0.764 0.042 *** 0.809 0.065 *** 0.084 0.051 *
Rho 0.594 0.053 ***
AGPOB_1787_1860 9.771 1.716 *** 10.522 1.806 *** 7.347 1.440 *** 6.015 1.640 *** 3.797 1.150 ***
DEN1860
PLV -2.93E-04 1.36E-04 ** -2.58E-04 1.43E-04 *
PEND 0.006 0.003 ** 0.010 0.003 ** 0.008 0.002 *** 0.006 0.003 ** 0.037 0.006 ***
PEND^2 -0.001 0.000 ***
ALT -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 ***
DISTBCN -0.009 0.004 ** -0.007 0.004 * -0.010 0.003 *** -0.007 0.004 *
THEIL1NOR_CONT
THEL1NORM_POBMA -4.746 0.815 *** -3.032 0.653 *** -3.571 0.776 *** -1.156 0.537 **
ER5T1 0.247 0.065 ***
CPJ -0.166 0.077 ** -0.124 0.065 *
DM_KING -0.091 0.027 *** -0.059 0.032 *
DMES70a -0.137 0.036 *** -0.074 0.034 **
N
Log-likelihood
Adjusted R-squared
Schwarz criterion
Akaike criterion
Hannan-Quinn
-72.728
229 229
44.364 94.547
0.350 0.639
-37.646
292 292
56.717
0.583
84.511 -85.652 -61.646
-175.09491.292
120.706 -68.020
-97.434
-45.258
103.074
OLS
OLS - Only 
Vineyard
OLS Spatial LAG - 
Only Vineyard
292
-24.892
106.551
69.783
TOBIT (2)TOBIT (1)
